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Chicken suits and other aspects of situated credibility contests: 
Explaining local trajectories of anti-minority activism 
Why do some towns become focal points for anti-minority activism at particular 
moments in time, when other towns with similar socio-economic conditions do 
not? While policy practitioners charged with responding to such activity frequently 
ask this question, it has received less academic attention. Consequently, an 
adequate response falls between different strands of the academic literature on anti-
minority politics.  
We explore this question through a comparative analysis of how and why Luton, a 
Bedfordshire town, became a focal point for the latest wave of organised anti-
minority activism in the UK, centred around the English Defence League (EDL), 
while Blackburn with Darwen, a local authority in Lancashire with a history of 
extreme right political ‘successes’, did not. 
We develop the concept of situated credibility contests to help us articulate the 
contingent relationships between potential explanatory variables and political 
outcomes, and describe how ‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ variables interact 
through the strategic actions of anti-minority activists and their opponents. 
 
Keywords: English Defence League, credibility contests, mobilisation, anti-
minority activism, extreme right 
 
Introduction 
Why do some towns become focal points for anti-minority activism1 at particular 
moments in time? While policy practitioners charged with responding to such activity 
                                                 
1 We use ‘anti-minority politics’ and ‘anti-minority activism’ as hypernyms to include all forms of 
activism explicitly targeting minority groups. It encompasses a broad range of ideologically 
distinct groups ranging from the ostensibly single-issue ‘anti-Muslim’ politics of the EDL to the racial 
nationalism of extreme right formations like the BNP and NF. 
frequently ask this question, an adequate response falls between three strands of the 
academic literature on organised anti-minority politics. First, there are local case studies, 
often informed by detailed ethnographic research (Hewitt 2005; Husbands 1983; Rhodes 
2009; Roy 1993). These provide valuable insight into how anti-minority politics gains 
and sustains traction through local struggles over power, recognition and opportunity, and 
the linking of local narratives and symbols with more abstract ideas about in-groups and 
out-groups, threats and opportunities. Yet they rarely use cross-locality comparisons to 
test the hypotheses they generate. Hypothesis testing is further stymied by the fact that 
the case studies are invariably places where anti-minority activism gained momentum, 
rather than where it stalled. 
Second, there is the literature on spatial patterns of support for anti-minority 
politics (Biggs & Knauss 2012; Ford & Goodwin 2010; Kaufmann & Harris 2015). This 
research, which plots such support against demographic, economic and political 
variables, is inherently comparative and highlights the structural conditions conducive to 
anti-minority politics. Yet it reveals little about the mechanisms through which certain 
configurations of structural ‘drivers’ translate into support for or participation in anti-
minority politics, and less still as to why on other occasions they do not. Reliance upon 
polling data also make such approaches less suited to capturing ‘sub-political’ (Hewitt 
2005) forms of anti-minority activism.  
Third, a recent turn to the literature on social movements has provided a more 
theorized understanding of anti-minority activism and a less caricatured account of anti-
minority activists (Caiani et al 2012; Klandermans & Mayer 2006). It provides insight as 
to how and why anti-minority activism sometimes veers towards more radical strategies 
of action (Caiani & Borri 2013; Macklin & Busher 2015); how anti-minority activists 
respond to and create political or discursive opportunities (Koopmans & Muis 2009); the 
pathways through which individuals enter and leave anti-minority activism (Blee 2003; 
Linden & Klandermans 2007); the emotional dynamics of anti-minority politics (Virchow 
2007); and the role of cultural (re)production in promulgating support (Miller-Idriss 2017; 
Simi & Futrell 2010). Yet with respect to our question, this literature suffers from similar 
limitations to that on the local dynamics of anti-minority activism. Comparative analysis 
is almost always cross-national (Caiani & Borri 2013; Klandermans & Mayer 2006; 
Macklin & Virchow 2011) or occasionally cross-regional (De Witte & Klandermans 
2000) rather than cross-local. It also tends, with few exceptions (e.g. De Witte & 
Klandermans 2000), to focus on cases where mobilisation has gained momentum, rather 
than where it has not. 
In this article we attempt to make inroads into this limitation in the literature. We 
do this through a comparative case study of two English towns with broadly comparable 
socio-economic and political conditions that have experienced different trajectories of 
anti-minority activism: Luton, a Bedfordshire town thirty miles northwest of London, 
which became and remained a focal point for the most recent wave of organised anti-
minority activism in the UK, spearheaded initially by the English Defence League (EDL); 
and Blackburn with Darwen (hereafter Blackburn), a Lancashire town twenty-five miles 
northwest of Manchester, where this wave of anti-minority politics initially gained, but 
then lost, momentum. 
Through our analysis we develop the idea that the extent to which organised anti-
minority politics gains traction in a town is a product of the situated credibility contests 
that take place between anti-minority activists and their various opponents and 
competitors. Drawing on James Jasper’s ‘strategic perspective’ (2004) of mobilization, 
we conceive of anti-minority activism, like other forms of contentious politics, involving 
a range of ‘players’, more or less tightly entrained with one another, engaged in an open-
ended series of strategic moves within a series of ‘arenas’ that shape, and are shaped by, 
the interactions that take place within them (Jasper & Duyvendak 2015). Inspired by 
Joseph Nye’s observation that all forms of politics are, ultimately, ‘a contest of 
competitive credibility’ (2011, p. 106) we conceive that through these moves, players 
seek to enhance their own credibility and/or undermine that of their opponents in the eyes 
of the audiences they consider most relevant to the fulfilment of their objectives. This 
might entail opposing actors competing directly for similar forms of credibility e.g. claims 
to speak for ‘ordinary English people’ in the town. At other times, the contest might be 
asymmetric: while EDL activists sought to undermine the credibility of local authorities’ 
claims to be governing in the interests of all residents, they did not seek to replace them 
directly. 
What makes these credibility contests ‘situated’ is the way that the availability 
and value of symbolic materials that the players might draw on is shaped by local history 
and the production of local social memory and identity (Hewitt 2005), albeit local social 
memory and identity is produced in dialogue with regional, national or global 
developments (Zerubavel 1999). For example, how a town is situated within national 
debates about specific social problems might shape local social cognition about the nature 
and significance of those problems. Our basic contention is that where anti-minority 
activists are able to enjoy some successes within these situated credibility contests, they 
are more likely to gain traction and the town is more likely to become a focal point for 
anti-minority activism. 
We believe the concept of situated credibility contests has several strengths as a 
‘thinking tool’ (Bourdieu in Wacquant 1989, 50). First, by encouraging analysis of how  
‘demand side’ variables, relating to the psycho-social, discursive and structural drivers of 
support for anti-minority politics and ‘supply side’ variables, relating to how such 
movements build support through tactical, ideological or communicative innovations or 
the personal charisma of leaders, interact with one another through players’ moves and 
strategic choices, it serves to integrate ‘demand side’ and ‘supply side’ explanations of 
patterns of organised anti-minority politics. While most scholars emphasise the 
importance of both supply and demand side explanations (Goodwin 2006; Mudde 2010; 
Muis & Immerzeel 2017; Rydgren 2007), they are still largely treated as distinct but 
complementary explanations (Golder 2016). 
Second, because the concept encourages analysis of how different sets of variables 
interact through players’ strategic choices, it is well suited to rendering the inherent 
conditionality of the relationship between any one potential explanatory variable and 
political outcomes. The fact that variables are conceived of as interacting through the 
unfolding contest also encourages attention to the sequencing of events over time, 
currently an under-researched dimension of anti-minority politics (Golder 2016).  
Third, the idea of a credibility contest encourages that ‘equal and symmetric 
weight’ be given to those involved in anti-minority politics and ‘the other players whom 
they engage’ (Jasper 2015, 9). Whereas both supply and demand side factors tend in the 
existing literature to be discussed as they relate to the anti-minority actors,2 the concept 
of situated credibility contests encourages discussion of those factors as they apply to the 
contest. 
The following section introduces the EDL and the wave of anti-minority activism 
that evolved from it. We then describe the case study towns and research methods before 
presenting and discussing the research findings.  
 
                                                 
2 See for example analyses of how ‘discursive opportunities’ shape the trajectories of anti-minority 
politics (Koopmans & Muis 2009).      
The national context 
 
The EDL emerged from a series of demonstrations in Luton, following an incident on 10 
March 2009 in which activists from a radical Islamist group, Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah 
(ASWJ),3 disrupted a homecoming parade by the Royal Anglian Regiment, recently 
returned from Iraq. Incensed, a group of residents proposed a demonstration calling on 
Luton Council to act against such groups. When the council refused their application for 
a march, a group calling itself United People of Luton (UPL) announced a ‘Reclaim our 
Streets’ march for 13 April. Approximately 150-200 people attended: a mixture of angry 
locals and football ultras from across southern and central England. There were six 
arrests. UPL staged another demonstration the following month, resulting in widespread 
public disorder (Copsey 2010). From these events emerged a national network of activists 
who formed the EDL on 27 June 2009, ostensibly to protest against the spread of ‘militant 
Islam’. After initial small-scale demonstrations in London and Birmingham, it quickly 
gathered momentum. By the autumn, EDL demonstrations across the country regularly 
attracted in excess of 1,000 people, sustained by a network of local ‘divisions’ and 
considerable social media support.4 
The EDL heralded a new wave of anti-minority activism in the UK, 
organisationally and ideologically distinct from traditional extreme right groups such as 
the British National Party (BNP), albeit with some overlap in terms of issue frames and 
personnel. Although Tommy Robinson5, who led the EDL with his cousin, Kevin Carroll, 
was previously a BNP member, they made clear their unwillingness to ally with the BNP 
                                                 
3 A successor to the proscribed Al-Muhajiroun. 
4 At several points, the EDL’s Facebook following exceeded 100,000. 
5 Robinson’s real name is Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. 
(Copsey 2010). Furthermore, while the EDL protest narrative resonated with some 
extreme right positions regarding nationalism and the supposed threat of Muslims and 
Islam, there were important differences, including its rejection of biological racism. 
Indeed, the EDL styled itself as an ‘anti-racist’ organisation – a claim many activists made 
sincerely (Busher 2018; Pilkington 2016). Tactically, while the BNP had prioritised 
party-based organisation and electioneering over marching, the EDL embraced street-
based activism and favoured a fluid social movement structure: operating through a loose 
and often chaotic network of local divisions without formal membership and with porous 
group boundaries (Copsey 2010). 
The EDL began losing momentum from mid-2011 amidst protest fatigue, 
mounting legal charges against activists (usually for public disorder offences), intra-
movement ideological and tactical differences, factional rivalries and personal grudges 
(Busher 2016, 123-56). The energy of this wave of activism has been slow to dissipate, 
however. While the EDL largely collapsed, particularly after the departure of Robinson 
and Carroll in October 2013, the movement fragmented into a plethora of groups 
including, of most relevance to this article, the North-West Infidels (NWI). As of 2018, 
such groups continue to maintain their online presence and to demonstrate, albeit on a 
greatly diminished basis. Meanwhile, other groups mobilising around cognate issues, but 
without their roots in the EDL, have also emerged, such as Britain First, which formed 
initially as an offshoot from the BNP and has carried out actions in both Luton and 
Blackburn and, since 2017, the Football Lads Alliance, whose marches have at times 
attracted in the region of 10,000 participants and have been attended by Robinson, leading 
figures from the so-called counter-jihad movement, and senior members of the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP). 
Methodology 
Case study selection and local contexts 
We developed a comparative case study to integrate the strengths of the three 
aforementioned strands of literature on organised anti-minority politics – deep analysis 
of local political and sub-political struggles; cross-case comparison of structural 
conditions and a dynamic understanding of mobilization and counter-mobilization.6 Such 
an approach is not without challenges. Foremost among these is case selection, where 
variation along relevant dimensions must be offset against variation along other 
dimensions as well as consideration of practical concerns, such as access issues 
(Seawright & Gerring 2008). 
Luton’s inclusion in the study was largely beyond the research team’s control. 
The research was commissioned by a network of local authorities.7 Members of that 
network had identified Luton as a town of particular interest because it had become a 
national focal point for this wave of anti-minority activism. By ‘focal point’ we mean: 
 
1. It was a site of regular, and at times substantial, anti-minority protest. 
Following the EDL’s formation, two major demonstrations occurred in Luton 
in February 2011 and May 2012. While figures are disputed, the 2011 
demonstration was the EDL’s largest, attracting over 3,000 participants. A 
further demonstration in 2014 attracted 300-400 participants. Demonstrations 
                                                 
6 Financial and logistical constraints meant we were unable to extend beyond two case studies without 
compromising case study depth and detail. 
7 The Special Interest Group on Far Right Activity, sponsored by the then UK Department for 
Communities and Local Government. 
aside, local activists frequently undertook actions, including protesting against 
a charity football match raising money for Gaza (Primer 2013), at the opening 
of Luton’s Discover Islam Centre, and intervening in local debates about other 
policy issues such as town planning. Subsequently, Britain First has also 
conducted inflammatory events in the town, including a series of mosque 
‘invasions’ in 2014 and a ‘Christian Patrol’ through the largely Muslim Bury 
Park, in January 2016 (Parris-Long 2016). 
2. It was prominent in the protest narratives of groups at the forefront of anti-
minority activism nationally and internationally. Luton is repeatedly 
referenced on websites associated with the counter-jihad movement, such as 
Jihad Watch or the Gates of Vienna, to support arguments about a supposed 
clash of civilisations; during his trial in 2012, Anders Breivik referred to Luton 
as having ‘war-like conditions’ and ‘Islamic no-go zones’ (Metro Reporter 
2012), and Luton has recently been visited by prominent North American 
activists associated with Generation Identity (Luton Today 2018). 
3. Anti-minority activists operating in the town had, as a minimum, gained some 
sympathy among sections of the local population beyond core activists. 
Although the EDL as an organisation never sought election, making it difficult 
to gauge popular support, there is evidence that its brand of anti-minority 
politics gained some traction. In 2012 Carroll ran for Police and Crime 
Commissioner on behalf of the British Freedom Party, then operating in a 
loose alliance with the EDL. He polled 10.6 per cent of the vote (8,676 votes) 
across Central Bedfordshire. And while some of the focus group participants 
(see below) were critical of Robinson and the EDL, members of the research 
team saw Robinson greeted and high-fived by members of the public as he 
walked around Luton. 
4. Local public authorities perceived anti-minority activists to represent a 
significant challenge. During interviews and informal conversations, council 
and police officers working in different policy areas reported concern about 
how EDL activists might respond to policy decisions, and some mused in 
private that parts of the local statutory authorities had occasionally been ‘given 
the run-around’ by Robinson and Carroll. 
For comparison, we required a town where there were known to have been concerted 
efforts to foment support for this wave of anti-minority activism, but where such efforts 
appeared to have stalled. We also sought a town broadly similar to Luton in terms of 
socio-economic indicators identified elsewhere as relevant to patterns of support for anti-
minority politics, and members of the network that commissioned the study requested 
that the second case study should be in the north of England since Luton is in the 
southeast. 
While Blackburn (147,489 inhabitants)8 is smaller than Luton (203,201 
inhabitants), it was identified as having a similar-enough socio-economic profile to bear 
comparison. Both Luton and Blackburn have experienced industrial decline; they had 
identical levels of unemployment (8.3% of the working age population), well above the 
national average (5.6%); significant deprivation (using the Carstairs Index, out of 378 
local authorities in England and Wales, Luton ranked 25th most deprived and Blackburn 
44th); and both had become more ethnically diverse at a rate in excess of the national 
average (see below). Both towns also have particularly high proportions of Muslim 
                                                 
8 All demographic data is derived from the 2011 census. 
residents (24.6% in Luton, 5th nationally, and 27.0% in Blackburn, 3rd nationally) and 
high rates of Muslim population growth (10.0% between 2001 and 2011 in Luton and 
7.6% in Blackburn, compared with the national average of 3.2%).  
Crucially for our purposes, while this wave of anti-minority politics initially 
gained momentum in Blackburn, it soon stalled. Several Blackburn residents became 
active in the EDL and in April 2011 the EDL held one of its largest demonstrations in the 
town, attracting an estimated 2,000 supporters. However, the demonstration occasioned 
a violent clash between Robinson and a local activist, allegedly over that activist’s 
extreme right views, which exacerbated tensions between the Blackburn group and 
national leadership. Many local activists subsequently swapped allegiance to emergent 
splinter groups including the NWI and the English Volunteer Force (EVF). Since then 
anti-minority activism in the town has become more localised and sporadic. While the 
local authority, police and community representatives continued to treat the issue 
seriously, it was generally described as a problem that had been contained and they 
expressed confidence that prominent activists were perceived locally as ‘ring-leaders’ 
rather than ‘community leaders’ (B13 local authority worker) – a view borne-out in 
community focus groups. 
What makes this comparison particularly intriguing is that, historically, anti-
minority politics had greater traction in Blackburn than in Luton. Groups at the forefront 
of previous waves of anti-minority politics, including the National Front (NF) and BNP, 
have consistently struggled to build support in Luton. In contrast, such groups have 
previously achieved a modicum of success in Blackburn. The BNP gained a councillor in 
2002 and, four years later, two England First Party (EFP) councillors were elected. Prior 
to this, in the 1970s Blackburn had one of the more active branches of the NF and a 
breakaway faction, the National Party (NP), had two councillors elected in 1976, 
narrowly missing a third. Why then did this most recent wave of anti-minority politics 
take root and gain greater purchase in Luton than in Blackburn?   
Local authority staff in both towns also agreed to facilitate the research (see 
below). 
 
Methods 
 
The research combined quantitative and qualitative methods. Since the EDL does not 
contend elections, there are no quantifiable locality-specific support markers for them. 
Where quantitative strategies could be used was to analyse the demographic and socio-
economic contexts and the relationship between demographic change and area scores on 
cohesion and local political efficacy – factors identified elsewhere as relevant to patterns 
of support for anti-minority politics (Kauffman & Harris 2015, Wilks-Heeg 2010).  
Datasets were created from the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Office of National Statistics 
censuses, capturing demographic and socio-economic indicators including self-identified 
ethnic group, religious belief and country of birth. Overall diversity levels were measured 
using Simpson’s Diversity Index. An Index of Dissimilarity was calculated for Asian 
heritage groups and the Muslim population to capture segregation.  
Residents Surveys (2012-2013) were pooled to create a dataset relating to 
perceptions of cohesion and local political efficacy. The respective questions were: ‘To 
what extent do you agree or disagree that your local area is a place where people from 
different backgrounds get on well together?’ and ‘Do you agree or disagree that you can 
influence decisions affecting your local area?’ Total sample sizes were 2,207 for Luton 
and 2,251 in Blackburn. Answers were collapsed from a Likert scale giving summary 
scores for both questions.9 
The qualitative data comprised 44 key informant interviews (23 in Blackburn, 21 
in Luton), 11 community focus groups (6 in Blackburn, 5 in Luton) and informal 
discussions with relevant policy practitioners and community groups over approximately 
one year. Key informants included council officers, police officers, councillors, 
community workers, youth workers, teachers, interfaith workers and community activists. 
They were initially identified through liaison with council officers and, subsequently, by 
snowball sampling. In Luton key informants included EDL activists. Contact was made 
with EDL/NWI activists in Blackburn but the interviews fell through.10 We do not assess 
that this is a significant limitation as the focus of this study is on the purchase achieved 
by anti-minority activists, rather than on the motivations of individual activists; due to 
the range of other interviews and focus groups undertaken; and the research team’s 
detailed knowledge of this protest scene nationally (Busher 2013; 2016, 2018; Macklin 
and Busher 2015). Interviewees were asked to describe their personal experience of 
participating in, managing, or responding to this wave of anti-minority activism. 
Focus groups comprised 3-12 people. In Luton, two focus groups involved EDL 
supporters. The remainder encompassed local residents, organised with assistance from 
community workers. In both towns, focus groups were held in three areas known to have 
been targeted for recruitment by the EDL and cognate groups. Focus groups were divided 
by age: teenagers/young adults and older adults. Discussions encompassed general 
                                                 
9 The Residents’ Surveys are annual surveys run by professional market research companies 
subcontracted by each local authority.  
10 Perhaps due to legal proceedings against prominent local activists taking place at the time. 
feelings about the local area; how people from different backgrounds get on with one 
another; and experiences of and attitudes towards groups like the EDL. 
A timeline of events was developed based on key-word searches of local news 
websites, blogs, social media platforms, activist memoirs and academic publications. 
Approximately 25 keywords were used to retrieve information from the news websites. 
Timelines were subsequently developed iteratively through the interviews and focus 
groups, enabling us to document local issues, grievances and events that respondents 
identified as salient. 
Data were coded initially to four sets of variables derived from the existing 
literature on patterns of anti-minority politics: potential catalytic events; socio-economic 
and political conditions; the emergent local structures of anti-minority mobilisation; and 
the actions of those who sought to manage or inhibit this wave of anti-minority politics. 
A secondary set of codes was then developed relating to each set of variables, coding up 
from the data to identify variation between the two case studies and develop emerging 
hypotheses about how differences across the case study towns might relate to the 
observed trajectories of anti-minority politics. Emerging hypotheses were iteratively 
refined through discussions within the research team and presentations to policy and 
practitioner audiences with detailed knowledge of the case study towns. 
 
Research findings 
 
We organise the discussion around the four sets of variables described above: potential 
catalytic events; socio-economic and political conditions; the emergent local structures 
of anti-minority mobilisation; and the actions of those who sought to manage or inhibit 
this wave of anti-minority politics. Our intention in doing so is threefold: to enable us to 
reveal the contingency of the relationship between each set of variables and the trajectory 
of anti-minority activism in the two towns; to explore the interdependencies between the 
different variables; and to demonstrate how the concept of situated credibility contests 
can help us to articulate these contingencies and interdependencies.     
 
The catalytic event  
 
The obvious starting point for an explanation of why and how Luton became a focal point 
for this wave of anti-minority politics is that it was the site of the March 2009 ASWJ 
protest. This event undoubtedly provided a ‘moral shock’ (Jasper & Poulsen 1995), 
generating outrage that precipitated the initial UPL protests that laid the foundation for 
the EDL. As one individual involved in those events recalled, 
 
It was that defining moment, that sort of moment of, like, ‘We need to do 
something. That’s it. I don’t care what it is, that’s it.’ (L12, EDL activist). 
 
That these events happened in Luton helped to ensure that Luton-based activists 
were prominent within the emergent movement and that, for EDL activists and 
supporters, the town became a site of enduring national and international symbolic 
importance as ‘the place where it all began’,11 facilitating subsequent efforts by Luton-
based activists to attract support and media attention.  
Newspaper outrage attests to the symbolic potency of this event. Stopping short 
of violent attacks, it is hard to imagine more provocative images for much of the British 
                                                 
11 A by-line used to promote subsequent EDL demonstrations in Luton. 
public than Al-Qaeda (AQ)-inspired extremists standing in front of a war memorial 
holding placards besmirching British soldiers as ‘Butchers of Basra’ and facing-off with 
horrified military veterans. They provided an ideal ‘condensing symbol’ (Jasper 2007, 
176) for the ‘clash of civilisations’ narratives that became central to the EDL’s claim-
making (Copsey 2010). The fact that, while police protected ASWJ activists, members of 
the Luton public opposing them found themselves facing public disorder charges, was 
repeatedly used by EDL activists to support claims about unfairness and public authority 
bias. 
Yet we soon find elements of contingency. Luton was not the only town to 
experience provocative actions by AQ-inspired activists around this time, whether in the 
form of anti-UK or anti-democracy protests, public conversion ceremonies or public 
proclamations celebrating the feats of AQ (Wiktorowicz 2005). Indeed, a similar 
demonstration took place in Barking, London, in June 2010. Blackburn, meanwhile, was 
not without its possible catalytic events. These included potentially volatile allegations 
regarding the ‘grooming’ of white girls by Muslim men – allegations similar to those that, 
in towns like Rotherham and Rochdale, were associated with a significant and enduring 
increase in anti-minority activism (BBC 2017). Yet attempts by anti-minority activists in 
Blackburn to exploit the symbolic potency of this news story largely fell flat.  
So what made the Luton ASWJ protest a more effective catalyst than other 
similarly provocative actions by AQ-inspired activists?  And why were the ‘grooming’ 
allegations in Blackburn not as effective a catalyst for organized anti-minority activism 
there as they were in other towns? Part of the explanation might lie in the timing of events. 
The first instance of any form of event is likely to attract greater media attention and 
provoke stronger emotional responses than subsequent cases (Collins 2001). The Barking 
protest may have attracted less attention and generated less outrage because it replicated 
what had happened in Luton; and in the case of the grooming allegations, national media 
attention was already focused upon towns such as Rotherham and Rochdale. Furthermore, 
when the grooming allegations emerged in Blackburn the organisational capabilities of 
the local anti-minority protest scene were curtailed because several prominent activists 
happened to be incarcerated (below).  
As we now discuss however, we can generate a fuller and more satisfactory 
explanation by considering how these events related to the wider socio-economic and 
political situations in the two towns, and how anti-minority activists and their opponents 
responded to these events and to each other’s attempts to frame these events in ways 
consonant with their interpretations of the world and their emergent interests. 
 
The social and political context 
 
We identified three points of variation between the socio-political contexts in Luton and 
Blackburn that might help to explain the trajectories of this latest wave of organised anti-
minority activism in the two towns. The first of these is the pace and distribution of 
demographic change in Luton. While both Luton and Blackburn have experienced 
demographic change at well above the national average, the rate of change in Luton is 
particularly rapid – greater than almost any local authority outside Greater London 
(Figure 1, appendix). The combined minority share of the population in Luton now 
exceeds that of the white British population share, making Luton, like Leicester and 
Slough, a majority minority town. There are also noteworthy differences in the 
distribution of demographic change. While Blackburn has several wards that remain 
relatively unchanged demographically (nine out of twenty-three are still over 90% White 
British) in Luton only three of nineteen wards are over 70% White British. While a 
substantial proportion of Blackburn is yet to have direct experience of demographic 
change, the same cannot be said in Luton. 
Since previous research shows a positive correlation between the rate of 
demographic change and electoral support for anti-minority politics (Bowyer 2008; 
Kaufmann & Harris 2015), local authority level ethnic diversity and opposition to 
immigration (Kaufmann & Harris 2015), and ward level growth in the minority 
population share and BNP support (Bowyer 2008; Ford and Goodwin 2010), it might be 
argued that the patterns of demographic change in Luton were particularly favourable to 
a surge in anti-minority politics.  
What also stood out from local Residents’ Surveys was that levels of perceived 
political efficacy among white UK-born residents in Luton were particularly low: 51% 
say they have no or little say in local decision-making, as compared with 42% in 
Blackburn. These perceptions might have played into the hands of anti-minority activists 
since the EDL, like earlier anti-minority groups (Wilks-Heeg 2010; Rhodes 2009), claim 
to speak for the concerns of those supposedly ignored by the ‘liberal elites’, appealing to 
disenchantment with established political parties among economically and socially 
marginal populations (Winlow, Hall & Treadwell 2017). 
We found several reasons to be cautious about leaning too heavily on explanations 
based on these two variables, however. We found no evidence that concerns about 
immigration or diversity were more intense or widespread in Luton than in Blackburn,12 
and until as recently as 2006/7 organised anti-minority politics had achieved greater 
                                                 
12 The percentage of white UK-born residents who disagree that their local area is ‘a place where people 
from different backgrounds get on well together’ was in fact higher in Blackburn (23.8%) than in Luton 
(16.4%), although this might reflect a difference in how the question was worded in the respective 
surveys: in Blackburn it specified ‘Blackburn with Darwen’, while in Luton it was ‘your local area’. 
traction in Blackburn than Luton. Furthermore, the qualitative data indicated that, while 
perceived self-efficacy among white British residents might be higher in Blackburn 
overall, there are several neighbourhoods where the default position is one of deep 
scepticism about whether the public authorities listen to ‘people like us’. 
The third variable relating to the social and political context was the alignment of 
the potential catalytic events and emergent wave of anti-minority activism with prior 
narratives about local social relations. Of note in Luton was the consistency with which 
interviewees, whether from the council, police, civil society or the anti-Muslim protest 
scene, emphasised that the ASWJ protest was an incident that ‘magnified all the other 
issues’ (L03 local authority worker) or was ‘a catalyst for what’s been brewing for some 
time’ (L09 local authority worker). None referred to it as a starting point; a subtle but 
important difference. 
Luton respondents consistently situated the ASWJ protest and subsequent events 
within narratives of a much longer and largely sub-political struggle in the town, in some 
cases stretching back to gang fights in the 1980s between the mainly Asian-heritage Bury 
Park Youth Posse and the predominantly white Farley Hill Boys. To some extent these 
narratives were woven around generalised claims of ‘unfairness’ similar to those found 
in other towns, including Blackburn, where anti-minority activism has periodically 
gained traction (Cockburn 2007; Hewitt 2005; Thomas et al 2018) – that the council 
offered more support to Muslim cultural festivals than St. George’s Day parades; that the 
police had not tackled ‘Muslim heroin dealers’ for fear of being labelled racist; that 
Muslim councillors allowed their relatives to abuse planning regulations;  and even that 
street signage rules were applied more leniently in ‘Muslim’ areas. Such arguments were 
woven around and, in the minds of some respondents, given credence by, well-known 
local incidents, including the 1995 murder of Mark Sharp, a young white man killed by 
Asian-heritage youths; an incident in October 2001 in which 15-20 ‘Asian’ men marched 
on a public house chanting ‘pro-Afghanistan slogans’ (Luton Today 2001) and protracted 
complaints during the early 2000s that the council and the police had done too little about 
radical Islamist stalls in the town centre which, in what might now be interpreted as a 
precursor to the formation of the EDL, culminated in 2004 with a group of local residents, 
including Robinson, staging a ‘ban the Luton Taliban’ march (Booth, Taylor & Lewis 
2009).  
What also gave credence to the idea that the ASWJ protest was ‘a catalyst for 
what’s been brewing for some time’ was the strength of Luton’s prior association with 
radical Islamist networks and its prominence within the local and national collective 
conscience in this regard (Hughes 2010). During the 1990s and early 2000s the town was 
a regular stop for Islamist clerics such as Omar Bakri and Abu Hamza (O’Neill & 
McGrory 2010). While the presence of Islamist extremist activists in Luton has 
subsequently diminished, partly due to the convictions and subsequent imprisonment of 
local activists, and the efforts of local mosques to expel such elements (Bhogal 2017), 
Luton has continued to feature prominently in national media discourse around these 
issues. Several respondents recalled a Daily Mail article from 2005 that dubbed the Bury 
Park area ‘Al Qaeda Street’, and periodic related news stories have contributed to the 
persistence of this association: in 2010 it emerged that the Stockholm bomber had spent 
time in town, and in 2013 a plot to drive a bomb into a Territorial Army centre in Luton 
using a remote-controlled toy car attracted national media attention.   
Other towns, including Blackburn (e.g. Gardham 2010), have also seen terrorism-
related arrests, but few have the same length of association with radical Islamist networks 
or have gained such consistent prominence within national debates about AQ- or ISIS-
inspired violence. Where Blackburn has featured in national media and public debates 
about Muslims in Britain, is in relation to the issue of segregation13 which, while of 
considerable policy and public concern, is not as incendiary as extremism or terrorism. 
Luton’s association with radical Islamist networks, amplified through national 
and local media and policy discourses, afforded the emergent UPL/EDL protest narrative 
particular local resonance, focused as it was upon fears about radical Islamism and the 
supposed failure of the state to inhibit its functioning and growth. Yet such narrative 
connections, which effectively rearticulated  past grievances while infusing them with 
hitherto unrealized significance, did not materialise out of media discourse alone. Rather, 
it required narrators on the ground with sufficient skill, and chutzpah, to weave that 
narrative in a way that could mobilise public support. As one local authority worker in 
Luton put it, 
 
Why did it happen here? Because we’ve got a couple of gobby characters who 
thought they had the balls to kick off on something that people moaned about in 
the pub. (L07). 
  
It is to this issue that we now turn. 
 
Local processes of anti-minority mobilisation 
 
                                                 
13 See the BBC Panorama investigation ‘White Flight’, or the furore around Jack Straw, MP’s, comments 
about the veil (BBC 2006). Blackburn has the most segregated minority population as a whole of any 
local authority in England and Wales (Luton is ranked 49th). 
In both towns, mobilisation initially took place through dense social networks in which 
most individuals had multiple and often close ties. As elsewhere in the country, these 
included football scenes (Copsey 2010), but also family, neighbourhood and friendship 
networks (Busher 2016: 41-3). As the EDL gathered momentum, these networks 
expanded, and social and kinship networks became political networks. 
Two differences between the towns stand out, however. The first is the calibre of 
local leaders. In Luton, even council, police and civil society respondents critical of the 
EDL expressed grudging respect for Robinson and Carroll as activists or opponents. 
Robinson was repeatedly described as charismatic and Carroll as having ‘quite a 
presence’ (L06 police officer). The same respondents also acknowledged their political 
acumen, offering multiple examples of their ability to ‘strike a chord’ (L06 police officer) 
with some segments of the public. These included a letter Robinson sent to several local 
authorities threatening to hold EDL marches in their towns unless Christmas celebrations 
were labelled thus rather than as ‘winterval’ celebrations;14 their support for an ultimately 
successful campaign for land in Luton to be used for affordable housing rather than a new 
mosque (Luton Today 2011); scaling the FIFA building in Zurich to demand that the 
England football team could wear remembrance poppies, and an incident in which 
Robinson vaulted a barrier to punch an Islamist activist who had burned a remembrance 
poppy at the 2010 Remembrance Day memorial. 
In Blackburn, the situation was vastly different. The local activist scene was 
described by police, local authority and civil society respondents as disorganised and 
lacking political adroitness or local cachet. There was a common view that though some 
young people looked up to these activists, ‘outside the group there’s acceptance that they 
                                                 
14 There is an annual myth, for which there is scant evidence, that councils across Britain consider re-
branding Christmas festivities to avoid offending non-Christian communities (Allen 2013).   
are just ex-football hooligans’ (B05 local authority worker). This was reported even in 
neighbourhoods where leading activists lived and might therefore have expected to 
generate support through friendship and family networks. Respondents attributed this to 
their violent behaviour15 and ill-judged decisions about what issues to mobilise around 
and how – aside from a protest in a local park,16 which achieved some resonance. 
An EDL protest outside a Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) franchise in October 
2010 against the sale of halal chicken encapsulates this point. While the demonstrations, 
for which Bernard Holmes, one of the local leaders, dressed up in a giant chicken suit, 
succeeded in ‘stirring up’ some young Asian-heritage residents (B03 police officer), it 
generated more ridicule than respect. Local KFC customers, hungry for fried chicken, 
simply ignored what was described as the small and ‘pretty pathetic’ (B01 police officer) 
demonstration, while local media drew attention to Holmes’ violent past and played on 
the double meaning of ‘chicken’, further undermining the group’s credibility (Chadderton 
2010). 
                                                 
15 The EDL’s association with public disorder has been identified as undermining support within low 
income white communities in other towns (Thomas et al 2018). While Robinson was also associated with 
violence, there are important differences in the targeting and style of their violence: vaulting a barrier to 
punch somebody who has desecrated a national symbol is not equivalent to, for example, an unprovoked 
assault on anti-racist activists (see footnote 31).  
16 Queens Park became a focus for EDL activities after an Asian-heritage teenager murdered Christopher 
Foulkes there in 2009. The EDL utilised the killing in their campaigns. In 2011, activists decided to 
‘reclaim’ the park by playing football there on a pitch usually used by Asian-heritage youths. On one 
occasion, when a group of Asian-heritage youths arrived, arguments ensued, leading to the arrest of an 
EDL activist, who later pleaded guilty to using racially aggravated threatening behavior. The event 
replicated and amplified local grievance narratives. In court, the activists’ lawyer stated, ‘My client heard 
racist comments coming from the Asian males and he accepts that he responded. He says he can’t 
understand why the police officers seemed unable to hear the comments coming from the other side’ 
(Bellard 2011).  
Further reputational damage occurred in July 2011 when five ‘flash protests’ (see 
Busher 2016, 6) across East Lancashire culminated in brawls between EDL activists and 
Asian-heritage youths. Several activists were arrested, including Holmes who was jailed 
for eighteen months, removing him from the local activist scene. The following July 
several NWI activists, including leader, Shane Calvert, were arrested and jailed for a 
violent assault in Liverpool (BBC 2013). 
Local authority and police respondents in Blackburn observed that there were 
more adroit activists in nearby towns, who mobilised under the EVF banner in September 
2013 in response to the allegations of ‘grooming’ in some of Blackburn’s shisha bars. 
However, anti-racist activists, community workers and council officers reported that they 
had effectively undermined support for such mobilisations by portraying these 
individuals as outside trouble-makers – a strategy never available to those seeking to 
curtail EDL influence in Luton. 
Another difference between Luton and Blackburn concerned activists’ positioning 
with regards to the established extreme right. Although Robinson was briefly a BNP 
member around 2004, he and Carroll subsequently sought to distance the EDL from such 
groups, organisationally and ideologically. Openly criticising the BNP and NF, they 
instead forged associations with actors in the counter-jihad movement, including Pamela 
Geller, Robert Spencer and Alan Lake (Mulhall & Lowles 2015). 
By contrast, many Blackburn activists appeared more comfortable fostering ties 
with extreme right groups. Indeed, this contributed to the tensions that would result in 
Robinson’s fight with a local activist at the 2011 Blackburn demonstration. Overtly racist 
and extreme right slogans regularly adorn the NWI’s Facebook pages and NWI activists 
have taken part in events organised by openly Nazi groups including National Action, 
banned as a ‘terrorist’ organisation in 2016. 
The explanation for this difference will undoubtedly be multi-faceted. While it 
might partly reflect the variation in political astuteness discussed above, it probably also 
reflects activists’ personal mores. In the case of Robinson and Carroll, their aversion to 
biological racism likely reflects their socialisation within ethnically diverse social milieux 
– both have close friendship and family ties that span multiple ethnic backgrounds (Hsiao-
Hung Pi 2016; Robinson 2015), which in turn might reflect the different demographic 
profiles of the two towns: the super-diversity of Luton with relatively low levels of ethnic 
segregation, compared to Blackburn, which has exceptionally high levels of segregation. 
Subsequently, Robinson and Carroll’s ideological development was also influenced by 
the counter-jihad activists they encountered, who tend to eschew traditional extreme right 
positions on race and ethnicity. 
Whatever the reasons for this difference, it is likely to have had a bearing on 
activists’ ability to build local support. Being ‘extreme right’ carries a heavy stigma, even 
among people who may otherwise sympathise with some of the arguments and 
sentiments. While many local people, including some focus group participants, regarded 
the Luton EDL leadership as ‘trouble-makers’, unlike the Blackburn leadership they were 
not perceived, or easily dismissible, as racist thugs. Their efforts to distance themselves 
from the extreme right created opportunities for them to outmanoeuvre local opponents 
seeking to depict them as such (see below).  
Once again, however, there are important contingencies. Robinson and Carroll’s 
ability to capture public and media attention was partly derived from living in a town that 
was of symbolic importance for the counter-jihad movement and for national debates 
about AQ-inspired extremism prior to the ASWJ protest: their charisma was a product 
of, as well as a cause for, their initial successes in mobilising support. Furthermore, while 
they demonstrated a knack for identifying political opportunities, they arguably 
developed these skills through action. Robinson had a reputation as a ‘fixer’ within 
football networks and Carroll was well-known within his local community, but neither 
they, nor people in their immediate circles, had significant prior experience of political 
organising. Some activists involved in early demonstrations admitted even copying 
tactics from YouTube videos of their opponents, Unite Against Fascism. Yet their 
position at a nodal point within nascent national and eventually international activist 
networks enabled them to access support from and provided opportunities to learn from 
more experienced activists (Hsiao-Hung Pi, 2016; Copsey, 2010). Meanwhile, a 
burgeoning public profile afforded Robinson and Carroll opportunities to hone their 
communication skills, enhancing the cachet that flowed from being the EDL founders. 
The Blackburn EDL leadership also encountered more established political 
activists eager to take advantage of this wave of anti-minority mobilisation; including a 
former EFP councillor. There was, however, an important difference. While the Luton 
leadership came into contact and exchanged ideas with experienced, extensively-
connected and politically astute individuals from the international counter-jihad 
movement, the Blackburn leaders were engaging with individuals marginal even within 
the British extreme right.  Blackburn activists became further isolated from national and 
international networks after several of them formed the breakaway NWI faction. The 
alliances they did form drew on the most ideologically and tactically extreme factions 
within the wider movement, further undermining efforts to achieve public credibility.  
Yet the outcome of the efforts of activists in Luton and Blackburn to position 
themselves as voices for disenfranchised ‘ordinary English people’ was also shaped by 
the responses of other players. 
 
State and civil society responses 
 Local authorities, police and civil society groups in both towns had, by the time our study, 
adopted strategies broadly similar to those of other towns facing an increase in organised 
anti-minority activism (Allchorn 2016). With regards to protest events, police and local 
authorities liaised extensively with one another, event organisers and community 
networks to manage events and their impacts. Meanwhile, civil society groups organised 
counter-demonstrations, framed as celebrations of diversity in order to diminish possible 
confrontation, with mediators working to minimise contact between opposing activists. 
In both towns, local authority actors undertook initiatives to strengthen 
perceptions of local political efficacy; promote positive experiences of cross-community 
relations; and address emergent community tensions, often building on prior community 
cohesion work. They declined, however, to engage with the EDL so as to avoid validating 
them as community spokespersons – a position informed by established anti-racist norms, 
personal views, and significant political pressure. The police, meanwhile, used whatever 
legal means they could to disrupt anti-minority activist networks. There were however 
potentially important differences between the two towns. 
The first of these relates to timing and learning. Luton had the misfortune to be 
the first town to experience this sort of mobilisation. Police, local authority and civil 
society respondents described struggling, initially, to understand what the UPL and then 
EDL was. Was it a new form of football hooliganism or a political protest? Was it an 
extreme right movement or something different? As one senior police officer recalled, at 
the time of the UPL demonstrations, Bedfordshire Constabulary, like other UK police 
forces, was also adapting to new facilitation-based protest management strategies 
recommended in the 2009 Adapting to Protest report: ‘It was all new to the police as well, 
all this negotiating thing, so a lot of it was guesswork’ (L15 police officer). Similarly, in 
terms of civil society responses, when the UPL marches began, networks such as the Bury 
Park Contingency Group, founded to coordinate multi-agency and community-based 
responses, had to be ‘convened quite hastily’ (L09 local authority worker). These factors 
combined to make management of the first events in Luton less effective than that of 
subsequent events, whether in terms of public disorder, community relations or the 
symbolic opportunities afforded to anti-minority activists to position themselves as the 
victims of an oppressive state and ‘political correctness’. This enabled anti-minority 
activism to gain momentum locally and anti-minority activists to become recognisable 
public figures. 
In contrast, when Blackburn first experienced an EDL demonstration, in April 
2011, considerable learning had already taken place within the police, the local authority 
and anti-racist groups. Demonstration management strategies, including the decision to 
seal off the whole demonstration area in Blackburn town centre, thereby separating the 
EDL from counter-demonstrators, was informed by learning from events in nearby towns:  
 
We had the rally at Preston […] and we’d seen the footage from Bradford and 
Manchester that went terribly wrong. And the Blackburn demo was [according to 
the EDL] going to be ‘bigger and better’, and all this. (B01 police officer) 
 
Anti-racist activists, local authority officers and faith networks also had more time 
to develop a coordinated grassroots response. Informed by the experiences of other towns, 
a local anti-racist network organised a defiant but non-confrontational celebration of 
Blackburn’s diversity; Muslim community activists mobilised to discourage physical 
confrontation with the EDL; and neighbourhood teams and youth workers undertook 
extensive liaison work before and after the demonstration. Similar strategies were used 
in the later Luton events, but not during the initial marches as the UPL and EDL gained 
momentum. 
A second point of variation was the alignment between the response and the type 
of organised anti-minority politics taking place locally. In both towns the response was 
informed, initially at least, by perceptions of the EDL as a combination of skinheads and 
football hooligans. In line with older anti-racist orthodoxy this entailed trying to police 
them away (i.e. making their marches miserable, wearing down local enthusiasm and 
morale, and placing onerous restrictions on demonstrations) whilst refusing political 
engagement.  
In Blackburn, this response broadly had the intended results. That it did however 
partly reflects the fact that the local EDL/NWI leadership validated a police-centric 
response by showing scant interest in engaging with formal local decision-making or 
dialogue. As the NWI lurched towards ever more extreme ideological positions and 
tactical repertoires it did little to challenge the credibility of their characterisation as 
extreme right thugs. 
In Luton a similar approach was less effective; arguably even counter-productive. 
As noted above, focus group, interview and observational data indicate that while 
Robinson and Carroll may have been quite widely perceived as ‘troublemakers’, 
depictions of them as ‘racists’ or ‘Nazis’ lacked credibility for many Lutonians, not least 
because they were known to have close and enduring friendships with prominent figures 
in local black and minority ethnic communities. However much race and ethnicity 
scholars critique the ‘I’ve got lots of black friends’ argument, it carries weight in everyday 
identity struggles outside academia. Furthermore, anti-minority activists in Luton did 
engage through more institutionalised political channels, including community meetings 
and petitions. By doing so, they reconfigured the arena of contestation to their advantage, 
leveraging the local authority’s unwillingness to engage with them as evidence that 
‘ordinary people’ were being ignored, and using their interventions in community politics 
to position themselves as community activists and ‘ordinary people’ rather than 
‘extremists’. The credibility of such positioning has been enhanced by their involvement 
in popular, and in some cases successful, campaigns, such as the aforementioned 
campaign for land to be used for affordable housing rather than a new mosque. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This comparative case study lays bare the multiple contingencies in the relationship 
between potential explanatory variables and political outcomes. While the fact that Luton 
is home to the EDL’s initial leaders is part of the story of how the town became a focal 
point for this wave of anti-minority activism, there might have been no EDL without the 
2009 ASWJ protest, or its leaders might have hailed from elsewhere in the country. The 
ASWJ protest provided an effective catalyst, but this was partly a product of the ease with 
which it could be made to fit with existing public and media narratives about the town – 
the incident could credibly be constructed as part of an unwelcome trend rather than an 
unpleasant aberration. Even then, things might have been different had, for example, 
Robinson and Carroll allied with the BNP rather than the counter-jihad movement; or had 
local authority, police and anti-racist activists in Luton not responded to the initial UPL 
mobilisations as if they were another group of ‘racist’ or ‘extreme right’ ‘hooligans’ – a 
response which, while eminently comprehensible in the context of limited information 
and considerable public and political pressure, was nonetheless exploited by Luton’s anti-
minority activists to reinforce their claims about the exclusion of the voices of ‘ordinary 
English people’ in public debates. 
 We have proposed that we can pick our way through these contingencies by 
thinking of anti-minority activists and their opponents as engaged in a series of situated 
credibility contests. The more successes that anti-minority activists achieve within these 
contests, the more likely they are to gain traction and the more likely the town is to 
become a focal point for anti-minority politics. Luton’s anti-minority activists achieved 
the traction they did because their claims to be voices of ‘ordinary English people’ 
achieved at least some credibility with local, national and international audiences: they 
repeatedly mobilised around issues that resonated with, and served to amplify, local, 
national and international narratives about the town, and sought to distance themselves 
from the extreme right, while undermining the credibility of the local authorities by 
pointing to their supposed failure to address AQ/ISIS-inspired extremism and arguing 
that their response to the UPL/EDL was symptomatic of their disregard for the concerns 
of ‘ordinary English people’. By contrast, the activities of Blackburn’s activists were 
poorly aligned with the local zeitgeist and their reputation for violence, combined with 
their  association with extreme right activities, made it relatively easy for their opponents 
to frame them as ‘troublemakers’ or ‘ring-leaders’ rather than ‘community leaders’. When 
more adroit activists came to Blackburn from other towns, their credibility was 
undermined by positioning them as more interested in ‘stirring things up’ than improving 
the lives of Blackburn’s residents.    
Further comparative time-series analysis of such contests is required to add 
definition to the concept of situated credibility contests and develop and test formal 
hypotheses: how, for example, do we conceive of locality-relevant audiences in a digital 
age? Is it possible to specify a relationship between the geographic distribution of 
catalytic events and leadership of anti-minority groups? Might we use this concept to 
account for the apparent ebb and flow of the ‘charisma’ of local anti-minority organisers? 
We believe nonetheless that the concept offers a useful tool for with which to explore 
cross-locality variation in the levels and persistence of traction achieved by anti-minority 
activism. Like other explanations of anti-minority politics, it invites analysis of demand-
side and supply-side factors. However, rather than treating them as complementary but 
essentially distinct explanations, it stimulates analysis of how they interact through 
players’ strategic choices over time. The primary focus on the contest encourages an 
important analytic rebalancing by treating the actions of state actors and mainstream 
political parties as dynamic players in the contest rather than treating them essentially as 
contextual variables for anti-minority politics. Finally, it retains as the centre of analytic 
gravity the basic idea that politics is, fundamentally, a contest of competitive credibility. 
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